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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC., 
WASATCH MOTORS, INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 
and PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, et al., 
Defendants. 
LEWIS BROS STAGES, INC., a corporation, 
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v. 
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et al., and SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION 
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Defendants. ) 
Case No. 10904 
Case No. 10907 
Case No. 10908 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
CONTINENTAL BUS SYSTEM, INC., et al., 
STATEMEN11 OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Publc Service 
Commission of the State of Utah which granted de-
f Pndant, Salt Lake Transportation Company, a certifi-
cate of conveniPnce and necessity to operate as a common 
n1otor carrier by motor vehicle for the transportation of 
passengt•rs and their baggage in the same or separate 
VPhiclPs, in charter operations, and in special operations 
in :sight-::;t~eing or passenger tours; between all points and 
1 
places within a 26 mile radius of 8alt Lake City anrJ 
within said arPa to all points and places therein, aniJ 
return, over predetermim•d rontes and/or irrrgular 
routes, excluding traffic originating or terminating al 
Provo, Utah. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
The Public Service Commission granted defendant, 
Salt Lake Transportation Company, the authority sought 
and issued Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 
538-Sub. 5. 
Petition for Rehearing and Reconsideration was filed 
by this plaintiff in a timely manner and rehearing "~' 
denied by the Public Service Commission. 
These actions of the Commission have been appealeu 
directly to this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This appeal seeks to have the lawfulness of thf 
original Order and Order on Rehearing of the C01mni~ 
sion inquired into, determined, annulled and set aside. 
PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
We will refer to the plaintiffs, Continental Bm 
System, Inc., American Bus Lines, Inc., Denver-Sult 
Lake-Pacific Stages collectively as "Continental"; <l• 
fendant, Public Service Cornmisson of Utah, as "Cont 
mssion"; and defendant, Salt Lake Transportaton Corn 
pany, as "Salt Lake Transportation." 
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With fow exceptions we shall set forth only the 
facts as they directly pertain to Continental's case, recog-
11iz,rng Uiat other plaintiffs, viz: Lake Shore Motor Coach 
Lines, d al., Lewis Brothers Stages, Inc., et al., are par-
liPs to this proceeding and will be filing separate Briefs. 
w,~ do nrge that the case must be considered on the 
<'ntire Ht'eonl and although we do not cite separately 
the farts (lr issues of other parties, we nevertheless 
incorporat1> th(~ir statements and arguments herein by 
reference and asst1rt reliance upon them in part for the 
settmg aside of the Commission's Order in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FAcr:rs 
In N ovemher of 1965 Salt Lake Transportation filed 
nn Application for a Certificate of Convenience and 
N1.>cessit)' before the Commission. It sought authority to 
uperate as a common motor carrier of passengers and 
baggage in intrastate commerce and attached to its Appli-
cation a ''Statement of Financial Condition" and a sched-
uJe of its equipment (R. 600-604). It proposed to operate 
as a <:ommon carrier for passengers and their baggage in 
the sauw or separate vehicles, in special operations, in 
sight~seeing or pleasure tours, between all points and 
tilacc-s in Davis, Morgan, Salt Lake, Utah, Tooele, Sum-
rnit and -Wasatch Counties; and from said counties to 
0tll pornts and placPs in the State of Utah, and return, 
Qi-(·1 pn'dPt~·rmined routes and/or irregular routes and 
ei;r~rnte nnder the name of Salt Lake Transportation or 
f1-ray l ,ine Motor Tours. 
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At the time of hearing, it amended its application 
restrictively, so as to provide that the sc•rvices reforn·d 
to would be performed betwt>n all points and vlace: 
within a 26 mile radius of the city limits of Salt Lakr 
City, Utah and from said radial area to all points anr) 
places in the State of Utah and return over predet~r 
mined routes and/or irregular routes and that the 2
1
; 
miles would be calculated on an air line basis (R. 25-2GJ 
Continental, along with other common carriers, 1rn1 
tested the Application. 
Continental is a common carrier doing business i1t 
both interstate and intrastate commerce and operate' 
in the State of Utah. The Commission took notice ot 
Continental's operating authority (R. 507) which is dr 
fined in the Order (R. 622). Continental holds authorih 
to operate charter round trips originating on U. S. Higl1 
way 91 in Salt Lake City south and between Provo allil 
the Deer Creek Damsite, which is located between Pron1 
and Heber City. It can also operate round trip chark 
service from Salt Lake City on U. S. Highway 40 we1 1 
to the Utah-Nevada line and from the Utah-Wyomint 
state line on the north to the Utah-Arizona state line 01~ 
the south from U. S. Highway 91. It is further author 
ized to conduct round trip charter trips from U. S. 
Highway 40 between Salt Lake City and the Utah-Colo 
rado state line or as an alternate route from U. S. High 
way 91 between Salt Lake City and Provo and from U. ~ 
Highway 189 between Provo and Heber City or fror 
U. S. Highway 52 from Orem to the junction of U. ~ 
4 
Higll\rn~' 18~) and from Heber to the Utah-Colorado state 
line OV('l' U. S. H iglnvay 40. It generally holds the au-
t)J.mty in sen'\' chart0r round trips originating on all 
roufos s<~rve<l in its n•gular common carrier operation, 
1'f~strictPd only· against transportation service for tours 
on any n•gnlar schedule or regular route and trips wholly 
witJ1in nnmicipal corporate limits served by urban trans-
portation cornpanit~s ( R. 622-623). 
A numhPr of witnesses appeared on behalf of Salt 
Lake 'l1ransportation, which fall into three general class-
ifications. Those vvl10 are affilated officially with a 
public or (~cnnmunity body; those with private business 
interests; and officials of Salt Lake Transportation. 
Within the first group were: H. Devereaux Jennings 
-- Assistant Director of the State Tourist and Publicity 
(R. 31); Lowe Ashton - President, Wasatch Chamber 
of Commerce (R. 70); Rnlon Doman - Scout Executive 
Emiritns, Boy Scouts of America (R. 88); Andrew R. 
--Hurley - City Attorney for Park City (R. 120); 
Mnrray .l'\I. Moler - Chairman, Utah Travel Council 
(R. 162); F. C. Koziol - Director of the Utah Park 
and Recreation Commission (R. 173); Henry Cameron 
- President, Granger-Hunter Chamber of Commerce 
(R. 187-188); Frank C. Burns - President, Kearns Lions 
Cl11b (R. ] 92); Ted Covington - Member of Board of 
T>ircctcns, Kearns Chamber of Commerce (R. 290); Ira 
B,•pslP.V - .Member of Board of Directors, Davis County 
Chamber of Commerce (R. 297); Reid D. Pace - Sum-
lllit County Cfork, Hoytsville, Utah (R. 308). 
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These witnesses generally testified they would fair, 
the additional tour and charter service offered by ~a; 
Lake Transportation, but the ·witnesses, without excel 
tion, testified they were not aware of deficiencies i 
existing transportation service and that they had nr, 
been refused charter transportation service. J ennin( 
(R. 55); Ashton (R. 86-87); Doman (R. 102); Hm/
1 
(R. 151, 153); Moler (R. Hi9); Koziol (R. 185, !Si 
Cameron (R. 189); Burns (R. 198-199); Covington q: 
296); Beesley (R. 306); Pace (R. 315, 316, 317). 
The second group were persons who own and opera1 
businesses in the ski resort areas. They testified fo 
Salt Lake Transportation to be able to transport peo1Jl1 
principally skiers, behveen Alta, Brighton, Park Cii 
and Wasatch State Park. These witnesses also said thr 
were not aware of deficiencies in existing carriers' cha: 
ter service. None of them had ever called Continen!i 
or been refused Continental's services. Gertrude Howa1 
- Owner-operator Mount Majestic Manor at Brigltti1 
(R. 241); Lee Bronson - Owner-manager Rustler Lo<l1 
at Alta (R. 324, 328). 
Mr. Charles A. Boynton, ,Jr., President and Gem: 
Manager of the Salt Lake Transportation, testified· 
to the Company's equipment and that Salt Lake Tran 
portation presently held certain charter authority. E 
hibit 5 (R. 528) contains this authority and limits l~ 
point of origin of Salt Lake Transportation in this r 
spect to Salt Lake City (R. 250) although Salt La 
Transportation has considered the Salt Lake City orif 
point to encompass the greater Salt Lake area (R. 28' 
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Salt Lake Transportation did not present an income 
tJinternent (R. 274) and its President said his Company 
wankd to compete with Continental's charter service 
rights (R. 27G). 
Salt Lake 'I1ransportation cmrently operates an air-
port limousine sPrvice, a rent-a-car service, and Gray 
Line Sight-sE>eing tours and the same equipment used for 
these operations would be utilized in its proposed charter 
service (R. 287). 
Concerning equipment, its witnesses testified that 
for prPsently authorized operations it has been necessary 
for the company to secure equipment from other carriers 
and at the present time the company has found it more 
1~conomieal to borrow additional buses from other car-
riers than to maintain its own (R. 332). During the 
skiing sPason the company operates sometimes 25 to 30 
n:hieles on Saturday mornings in January and it obtains 
as many as 15 or 20 buses from Lewis Bros. Lines (R. 
;)~3). Th(' last equipment purchased outright for charter 
:service b.v Salt Lake Transportation preceded the hear-
rng by some fifteen months (R. 334). 
Continental's evidence was introduced through Ex-
hihits 40 through 54 (R. 584-599c) and shows the Com-
pany's income statements, operating ratios, and bus miles 
operated, revenues derived in Utah, and equipment and 
linses licensed in Utah. Exhibit 51 (R. 596) shows Conti-
1Hnt'1 l's Utah investment to be $3,794,230.07 as of De-
r-0rnhc·r 31, 19G5 (R. 596) with a $525,480.43 payroll in 
l't:d1 for tlie year 1965 (R. 597). 
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Testimony and evidence showed Continental had nr,
1 
turned down anyone desiring charter service and ha, 
equipment available for this service at all times (R. 504
1 
Continental maintaim; and bases approximately 2: 
buses in Utah (R. 510) and derived $8,327 in revenues fo 
its charter service in Utah in 1965 (R. 513, 599). 
Tour and charter service revenues are set forth ii 
the Special Bus Revenue classification of the Company' 
Exhibits ( R. 584-599). The classification also contain. 
revenues derived from the interstate aspects of Conti 
nental's operations ( R. 514). 
The Record was closed June 21, 1966 and on Januar 
20, 1967 the Commission issued its Report and OrdP1 
substantially granting the authority sought by Salt Lak 
Transportation (R. 618-626) and as amended in its Ordr: 
issued April 6, 1967 (R. 645-647). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION FAILED TO MAKE ESSENTIAL 
FINDINGS. 
We recognize as we begin this argument that ti1 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 54-7-16 reqwr 
" ... The findings and conclusions of the commission r1 
questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subjci 
to review. Such questions of fact shall include ultirna' 
facts and the findings and conclusions of the comrnis~iv 
on reasonableness and discrimination." 
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It is 111andator,\·, however, that the Commission make 
findings on thP essPntial elPnwnts of the case, and if such 
f'iwling:-> an· not mad<', obviously a Commission Order is 
mm·asonahlc, arbitrary, capricious and unlawful and 
iiirn4 bt~ S(~t aside. 
'rlll' facts to lw established in a certificate proceed-
[ug rn tlw 8tate of Utah are> well defined and have been 
, rogn1ied for a substantial period of time. 
fu M 11.lcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 
:.:±5, 117 P .2d 298 ( Ul41), this Court stated as follows: 
"While evidence pertinent to any question 
involvrd in the application may be presented on 
the hearing, the commission's determinations 
would proce!'.d as follows: 
"Does the imblic convenience and necessity re-
quire further, new or additional common carrier 
s0 rvice in the territory proposed to be served~ 
l f not, the application should be denied. If such 
se>rvice is required, should the applicant be per-
mitted to re>nder it~ In determining the answer 
tu this question the commission shall consider the 
following matters: (1) Is the applicant finan-
eially able to perform the service~ If not, his 
application must be denied. (2) ·will the opera-
tions proposed unduly injure the highway over 
which the operations must be carried on, or un-
duly interfere with th0 use of the same by the 
traveling public? If either phase of this question 
be answ0red in the affirmative the application 
should be denied. (3) Although beneficial to the 
tnTitory to be served, would the service proposed 
be detrimental to the people of the states as a 
whole•~ If so, the application should be denied. 
(-1) Having found now that the convenience and 
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necessity of the r~ublic ii: _thP territory propost·rl 
to be served, require additional St>rvice; that sneh 
service will not be detrimental to the people of 
the state as a whole; that applicant is financially 
able to render the service; that the service will 
not unduly injure the highway or unduly interferi 
with the public traveling thereon, the question is: 
Should such new service be rendered by existino 
carriers or by the new applicant? This questio~ 
poses for the commission, not the finding of a 
factual answer, but the determinafaon of a matt"r 
of policy. Which in the opinion of the commission 
will best subserve the public convenience, neee1 
sity and welfare? And in determining thi8 matter 
the commission under the statute may and shou](] 
take into consideration the existing transportation 
facilities, their investment, the taxes they pay, 
the services they have rendered and are now rend. 
ering; the need of a continuation of such service~: 
the effect upon such services of a new obligatio11 
to serve; the effect upon such services of a new 
competitor in the transportation field; the effect 
of a new competitor or carrier upon the economic 
industrial, social and intellectual life of the terri 
tory, and other matters which may affect tl1r 
public welfare, and the growth and developmen' 
of the life in, and resources of the state. Tha· 
existing carriers engaged in transportation to aw 
from a certain field or territory, rendering tl11 
service it is permitted or ordered to do, reasov 
ably, adequately and efficiently, is not lightly o 
ruthlessly to be interfered with, or subjected 11 
needless competition, is evident from the proY1 
sions of the statute Section 5 of Chapter 65, ljai1,· 
of Utah 1935, after vesting in the commission tl1 
power to regulate and supervise all comnw, 
motor carriers reads: '* * * to n•gulate the faci: 
ities, accounts, service and safety of operatioi 
of each such common motor carrier, to regula' 
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operating and time schedules so as to meet the 
needs of any community, and so as to insure ade-
quate transportation service to the territory tra-
versed by such common motor carriers, and so as 
to prevent unnecessary duplication of service be-
tween these common motor carriers, and between 
them and the lines of competing steam and electric 
railroads; and the commisison may require the 
coordination of the service and schedules of com-
peting common carriers by motor vehicles or elec-
tric and steam railroads * * * .' 
"An applicant desiring to enter a new terri-
tory, or to enlarge the nature or type of the service 
he is permitted to render must therefore show that 
from the standpoint of public convenience and 
necessity there is a need for such service; that 
tho existing service is not adequate and conven-
ient, and that his operation would eliminate such 
inadequacy and inconvenience. He must also show 
that the public welfare would be better subserved 
if lw rendered the service than if the existing 
carrier were permitted to do so. The paramount 
consideration is the benefit to the public, the 
promotion and advancement of its growth and 
welfare. Yet the interests of the existing certifi-
cate holder should be protected so far as that 
can be done without injury to the public, either 
to its present welfare or hindering its future 
growth, development, and advancement. Corpora-
tion Comm. Y. Pacific Grevhound Lines, 54 Ariz. 
159, 94 P.2d 443; Chicago R.R. Co. v. Commerce 
Comm., 336 Ill. 51, 167 N.E. 840. Having given 
dm-' consideration to those matters the commission 
determines whether the existing carriers or a new 
one should be permitted to render the proposed 
service. lf the commission's determination finds 
j nstification in the evidence, it is not a law ques-
11 
~ion. and we cannot review or modify it or ~,, 
it aside. Regardless of what our own views on !Ji, 
matters may be, the determination of the COlil 
mission on this matter finds support or justifica 
tion in the evidencl>. \Ve cannot say it acted ari
11 
trarily or capriciously, and the finding thertr1
1 
must stand." 
Findings as to essential elements in this case, ho 11 
ever, are nonexistent. 
In Finding No. 1 (R. 619), the Commission sets forti 
the fact that Salt Lake Transportation presently holu 
certain certificates and the scope of its present authorit; 
In Finding No. 2 ( R. 619), the C01mnission mer11h 
states the authority Salt Lake rrransportation reqnes(P1: 
through its Application. 
In Finding No. 3, the Commission Orders stat11~ 
"It (Salt Lake Transportation) has more than adequat, 
equipment and facilities to conduct the proposed opera 
tion and is financially capable of doing so." 
This is an ultimate finding, if anything, and cori 
trary to the Record before the Commission which dii 
closes that Salt Lake Transportation had no intentio 
of placing into evidence even its financial statement (TI 
274). And with respect to equipment, the Record is aga1 
undisputed that Salt Lake Transportation presently rnu 
lease equipment from other carriers and that it intend1 
to borrow or lease equipment if it were authorized 1• 
proceed under this Application (R. 331-334). 
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Obvjom.;ly the Commission, based upon this testi-
Hiony, could not make an adequate finding that it has 
"more" than adequate equipment and facilities to conduct 
the proposed operation. It cannot tell us, for example, 
Y1lwtlwr the cost of equipment will make the service 
infeasible because there is no finding as to cost. It 
cannot tell ns whether equipmet for the service can be 
01 is to he leased and its cost. For present operations 
Salt Lake Tram;portation must borrow equipment and so 
on what factual basis can this company have "more" than 
adequate equiprnenO The Commission does not tell us. 
It has not made the necessary finding. 
Finding No. 4 merely reviews the sight-seeing and 
to1lf operations as conducted by Salt Lake Transporta-
tion in the past and adds nothing to essential findings 
reqnired (R. 620). 
Finding No. 5 purports to find that "There has been 
a substantial population and economic growth in the 
origin counties of the Application" (R. 620). And that 
"There appPars a need for transportation service which 
can originate at a point other than Salt Lake City in the 
origin counties of the Application and to serve to and 
from various points in Utah. 
This purported finding m like manner refers to 
allPged needs which are undefined. This is an ultimate 
finding or a conclusion not a finding as must be made 
11.1 a fact finding body so that a reviewing body can 
detPrmine whether authority has been exceeded. But 
there an• no facts upon which such a finding could be 
13 
based. The Record dis(·loses that Continental, as WPI: 
as other common carriers, can and arP p<.·rforming char-
ter service at the presc•nt tinw and ver.v ext<>nsivel\ 
through the areas in question. 
Continental's authorit:,, as has been pointt•d oni, 
extends from U. S. Higlnvay d<>signations in thP :w mili 
area in which Salt Lake rl'ransportation se<.·ks its anthr1r 
ity (R. 507). 
Other carriers' evidence was also impn•ssive in thi, 
respect. This testimony tracPs routes in great detail 
through certain areas and shows the extensive geograph) 
covered by these carriers. Mr. Joseph M. Lewis for 
plaintiff, Lewis Bros. Stages, testified as to certain of 
the Lewis Bros.' routes over which that Company and 
its affiliates are allowed to t•xtend round trip charte1 
service (R. 443-444), from which the Conunission is bonn1i 
to find, along with the other evidence in the Record that 
present carriers' charter and tour ability substantiall1 
blanket the area now sought to be certified to Salt Lakr' 
rrransportation. But the element with respect to the lar'r 
of need will be developed later. It is suffice to say he11 
there are no facts set forth in the findings from whid1 
the Commission's conclusion of "need," as set forth ir: 
Finding No. 5 (R. G21) can be predicated. 
Findings G through 14 describe the ntrious pro\eii 
ants before the Commission and their operating authnr 
ities and Finding No. 15 in conclusion form states: 
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"Because of the limitations of the authority 
of existing carriers it is apparent that they cannot 
11wet the requirements for service ontlined by the 
supporting witn('sst•s and proposed by the appli-
cant, for which the Commission finds a public 
need. 
* * * * * * 
rt apperars to the Commission that the grant 
of authority as applied for in the Application 
would not unduly affect existing carriers ad-
Hnwly and will not burden the highways, and 
will serve the best public interest and be respon-
sin~ to a pnblic need." (R. 624) 
Tliese conld only be argued to be ultimate findings 
at hef't and, in fact, represent conclusions, not findings at 
all. 
1'lw foregoing is all we have from the Commission 
on its 1nirportcd findings of public convenience and neces-
tiitv. rl'lw Commission has fallen far short of its statutory 
duty and has failed and refnsed to make findings. In 
no \Vay can we locate findings as to the essential elements 
of this case as dictated by authorities outlined above. 
The Commission is an administrative agency created 
by Statutes of the State of Utah, Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
Sec. 54-1-1 - 54-7-30 and although it engages in quasi-
,indicial functions, it is basically a fact finding body. 
It is an elementary rule of law that administrative 
agencies mnst make fnll and complete findings of fact 
1111un which to rest their decisions. As the cases which 
we will cite disclose, adequate findings of fact are an 
:ibsol ute neecssity. The basic reason for this requirement 
! ' lo L'uahl(• r1•vit•wing courts to determine readily whether 
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the administrative body has properly pursued its author-
ity, confined its inquiry to its statutory limitations, and 
correctly applied thP law to tht~ facts. Another wry 
practical reason is to aid the party litiganhl in framin,; 
I'' 
and the Court in deciding, the issues on appeal. n-1 
decision of the Commission completely violates this p1 11 
mentary principle of administrative law. 
In Volume 2, Davis, Administrative Law Treatis<>, at 
page 444, Section 16.05, the following is stated with 
respect to the requirement that administrative agene.if·~ 
must make full and complete fin dings of fact upon di~­
puted issues: 
"The practical reasons for reqmrmg ad-
ministrative findings are so powerful that the 
requirement has been imposed with remarkablP 
uniformity by virtually all federal and state 
courts, irrespective of a statutory requirernl'nt. 
The reasons have to do with facilitating jndil'ia\ 
review, avoiding judicial usurpation of admini-
strative functions, assuring more careful admini-
strative consideration, helping parties plan thei1 
cases for rehearings and judicial review, and keep-
ing agencies within their jurisdiction. 
"Much the most prominent reason discusser! 
in judicial opinions, and the reason which is 
clearly dominant in judicial motivation, is the 
facilitation of judicial review. A simple illustra-
tion will readily show the need for findings a~ 
an aid to judicial review. A statute provided that 
no milk license should be granted unless the ro111 
missioner 'is statisfied that the applicant is qual1 
fied by character, experience, financial responsi 
bility and equipment to properly conduct th~ pro 
posed business, that the issuance of the 11ccm1 
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will not tend to a destructive competition in a 
market already adequately served, and that issu-
ance of the license~ is in the public interest.' For 
tlw court to review a bnlky record without know-
i11g which of the 10ix factors the commissioner 
fomid to be lacking would obviou10ly be wasteful. 
Hardly wrprising \Va8 the court's holding that 
·Only after the commissioner has made findings of 
fact can the court decide whether the findings are 
sut;taincd by the evidence .... ' When issues are 
uwn· complex and interdc~pendent, the need for 
findings is even greater. 
"The language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, in a 
cm;e in which the Court could do no more than get 
an impression that the Commission may have 
acted properly, is often quoted: 'The difficulty 
is that it has not said so with the simplicity and 
clearness through which a halting impression 
ripens into reasonable certitude. In the end we 
art~ left to spell out, to argue, to choose between 
conflieting inf erenccs. Something more precise is 
requisite in the quasi-jnrisdictional findings of an 
administrative agency. . . . vVe must know what a 
decision means before the duty becomes ours to 
say whether it is right or wrong.' Mr. Justice 
Frankfurther has explained that the requirement 
'is merely part of the need for courts to know 
what it is that the Commission has really deter-
mined in order that they may know what to re-
view .... This is the real ground for the decisions 
which have found Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion orders wanting in necessary findings.' If 
there were no law requiring findings, judges strug-
gling with masses of evidence and hazy findings, 
trying their best to discover whether the agency 
has applied the proper principles, would surely 
invent such a requirement. Characteristic judicial 
remarks seem to manifest considerable patience: 
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'We only require that, whatevPr result be reacbrrl 
enou?h. be put of r~·cord to enable us to perfo
1111 
the limited task wl11ch is ours.' " 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the ca,
1
, 
of Colorado-Wy01ning Gas Company v. Federal I'o1li: 
Commission, et al., 324 U.S. G2G, 89 L. ed 1235, was cou. 
fronted with a similar situation. In that case an ess~, 1 
tial finding of fact upon which tlw Federal Povver Corn 
mission decision was based n'lated to the quantity ul 
natural gas actually sold by the public utility at a certain 
time, and the effect the 8ale had upon an allocation of 
costs. The Staff of the Federal Power Commission had 
used one method of making the determination and the 
Commission another. The findings, however, were nol 
sufficient to disclose to the reviewing court which method 
was the basis of decision, or why it was preferred. In 
other words, the reviewing court was presented with tl1~ 
dilemma of determining whether there was substantia: 
evidence to support FPC's ultimate finding, but was not 
provided with anything which showed the various factor~ 
and figures taken into consideration which were adopte1l 
by the Commission in arriving at its ultimate conclusion 
In respect thereto, the court stated the following, corn 
mencing at page 633, U.S.: 
"We do not know why the lower figure wn: 
rejected. There are no findings to guide us. li 1 
the record there is testimony which may suffice1'· 
a partial reconcilating of the difference and wh1d 
casts some doubts on the accuracy of the low~ 1 
figure. But we have been unable completely Ii 
reconcile the difference. 
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''rrlie reviL·w which Congress has provided 
for these ratP orders is limited. Section 19(b) 15 
USCA ~ 717 r (b), 4 FCA title 15, ~ 717 r (b) says 
that the 'finding of the Corrunission as to the facts, 
if ::;upported by substantial evidence, shall be con-
clusive.' But ·we must first know what the 'find-
rng' i::; hdore we can give it that conclusive weight. 
\Ve have repeatedly emphasized the need for clar-
1 ty aml compld<·ness in the basic or essential find-
ings on which administrative orders rest, Florida 
v. United States, 28~ U.S. 194, 215, 75 L. ed 291, 
:J04, flt S. Ct. 119; United States v. Baltimore & 
0. R. Co., 293 U. S. 454, 464, 79 L. ed 587, 594, 
55 S. Ct. 268; United States v. Chicago, M. St. 
P. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499, 504, 505, 510, 511, 
79 L. Pd 1023, 1028, 1029, 1031, 1032, 55 s. Ct. 462; 
TTnikd States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 
;H5 U. 8. 475, 488, 489, 86 L. ed 971, 982, 62 S. Ct. 
72:2. ThPir absence can only clog the administra-
t1vL'. function and add to the delays in rate making. 
vV \-' cannot dispense \Vi th them for Congress has 
provided thr standards for judicial review under 
this Act.~ 19(b). The courts cannot perform the 
function which Congress assigned to them in ab-
sence of adequate findings. Nor are they author-
izPd under ~ 19 (b) to make findings and substitute 
them for those of the Commission." 
A similar statement is contained in United States v. 
Chicar10, illilwaukcc, St. Panl & Pacific Railroad Co., 
294 U. ~. 499, 79 L. ed 1023, at page 510, U. S., where 
the following appears: 
"We would not be understood as saying that 
1lwn1 do not lurk in this report phrases or sen-
tcnees suggestive of a different meaning. O~e 
gains at places the impression that the Commis-
sion looked upon the proposed reduction as some-
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thing more. than 3: disruptive tend<>ncy; that it 
found unfairness 111 the old relation of parit· 
between B_raz~l an~ Springfield; and that tlw Di'\: 
schedule_ 111 its _Judgment would confirm Mil 
waukee m t~e enJOJ'1ll~n~ of an undue proporti 1111 
of. the traffic. The difficulty is that it has nut 
sai~ so with_ the_ simplic~ty and clearness throug]
1 
which a halt111g impress10n ripens into reasonahJ1 
certitude. In the end we are left to spell out, tu 
argue, to choose between conflicting infrnincl'i. 
Somthing more precise is requisite in thr qua,i 
jurisdictional findings of an administrativ(· a<• 
~ 
ency. Beaumont, S.L. & \V.R. Co. v. United Statr,, 
282 U.S. 74, 86, 75 L. ed. 221, 229, 51 S. Ct. J: 
Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 215 75 L 
ed. 291, 304, 51 S. Ct. 119. Vv e must know what n 
decision means before the duty becomes ours !11 
say whether it is right or wrong." 
That case involved railroad rates. The I.C.C. adjusted 
various rates but did not set forth sufficient findings \11 
indicate why it had done so, what the impact would hav1 
been if the current situation had been allowed to remain, 
etc. Only general conclusions were stated by the Corn 
mission to justify its action, so the court held that gen· 
eralizations to the effect that a change in rates wai 
necessary was not sufficient without further findings. 
In Sagniaw Broadcasting C01npany v. Federal Co111 
munications Conimission, 96 F. 2d 554, the Court u. 
Appeals for the District of Columbia handed down an 
exhaustive review of the reasons for requiring full an' 
complete findings, and a concise outline of just wlw 
those findings should contain and upon what subject-
they should be made. That case involved conflictlll' 
20 
a1J]Jlications for a certificate to construct a radio station, 
w w11i('h pnblic convenience and necessity had been found 
1n favor of one applicant and against the other applicant. 
'l'h(· !'onrt stated at page 559 the following: 
wrhe requirement that courts, and commis-
s10ns acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, shall 
make findings of fact, is a means provided by 
Congress for guaranteeing that cases shall be de-
cided aceording to the evidence and the law, rather 
tlian arbitrarily or from extralegal considerations; 
and findings of fact serve the additional purpose, 
where provisions for review are made, of appris-
ing the parties and the reviewing tribunal of the 
factual basis of the action of the court or com-
mission, so that the parties and the reviewing 
tribunal may determine whether the case has been 
(foeided upon the evidence and the law or, on 
the contrary, upon arbitrary or extralegal con-
siderations. When a decision is accompanied by 
findings of fact, the reviewing court can decide 
whether the decision reached by the court or com-
misiou follows as a matter of law from the facts 
stated as its basis, and also whether the facts so 
stated have any substantial support in the evi-
dence. In the absence of findings of fact the re-
viewing tribunal can determine neither of these 
things. The requirement of findings is thus far 
from a technicality. On the contrary, it is to insure 
against Star Chamber methods, to make certain 
that justice shall be administered according to 
facts and law. This is fully as important in re-
spect of commissions as it is in respect of courts. 
"In discussing the necessary content of find-
ings of fact, it will be helpful to spell out the 
proef'ss which a commission properly follows in 
n•aching a decision. The process necessarily in-
clndes at. least four parts: (1) evidence must be 
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take~ _a_nd Wf•ighed, both as to its accman 
111 cred1b1hty; (2) from att(•ntivP considerati' · 
this evidence a determination of facts of a 
1 ~~ ' 
or underl_ying natun• rnnst lw reached; (3) /;'.;: 
these basic facts tlw u l ti ma tP fact::-;, 11suall» in i:. 
language of the statut<>, ar<> to lw inf(Tred, or ni 
as the case may lw; ( 4) from this findinir t', 
decision will follow by thP application of thr· ~fa/' 
tory criterion. For exarnple, bdorp tlw Conunm 
ca_ti~ns Commission may grant a construction 1
11 
nut it must, undPr thP ::-;tatuh·, lw convin('ed t:, 
the public interest, COJff<•nit>nc<>, or nec<;ssitY 1 . 
be served. An affirmative or negative fo1di.11;.;, 
this topic would be a finding of ultimate fact~'' 
Commencing again at page 5G1 appPars the followi 11, 
"These decisions show that a reviewing COlll 
cannot properly exerci::-;e its function upon flli,J. 
ings of ultimate fact alonP, but must require al." 
findings of the basic facts "\vhich represent ti. 
determination of the administrative body as ·· 
the meaning of the evidence, and from whid1 tJ 
ultimate facts flow. Such findings are, we thiJ1~ 
just as necessary in cases involving the applicc 
tion of tlw statutory criterion of public comer 
ience, interest, or necessity set up by the Corn 
munications Act, as in thosP cases which nndt>r tl1 1 
Interstate Commerc(~ Act rPquire the applicatior 
of the standard of unjust discrimination, or i1 
those cases which under state public utility sta 1 
utes require the application of the criter:on 1 
public conveniencP and necessity." (Emphas1ssur 
plied) 
And again at page 562 : 
"As to financial qualifications, the appellwi 
urges as error the Commission's finding_tl.1at '1 1111 ' 
applicants are possessed of the reqms1te · 
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fmancial qualifications.' The question of financial 
qualification has at least two aspects: first, has 
the applicant enough resources to construct the 
slation and to operate it for a brief period of 
time; and second, is there a reasonable likeW10od 
of financial profit to be expected from the opera-
L10n of the station, or are the applicant's personal 
resources such that he is able and willing to 
operate a station for a considerable period of time 
at a Joss. 'J1he Commission's finding that the 
intervenors are financially qualified is an infer-
ence rather than a finding of fact, and does not 
disclose any facts bearing on either of the above 
a::;pec~ts of the question of financial qualifications. 
Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, supra. 'l1he Commission did make findings 
as to the present resources of the intervenors, 
which we think are adequately suppported by the 
record. 'I'he appellant urges, however, that the 
Commission erred in failing to find that a sta-
tion operated as proposed by the intervenors 
would not receive ::mfficient commercial support 
lo justify its operation. As to the likelihood of 
such commercial support the Commission said 
only that 'It is anticipated that the monthly in-
come expected to be derived from the station's 
operation would approximate $5,500.' This state-
ment can hardly be characterized as a finding as 
to the commercial support which the intervenors' 
station might farily expect. It is not even coupled 
with a statement as to the monthly expenses of 
the proposed station from which by inference the 
conclusion could be drawn that the station would 
have a reasonable likelihood of operating at a 
profit. Even though there may be evidence in 
tfo. · record - upon this we do not pass - from 
which the Commission might have concluded that 
th.; i 11tervenors would receive adequate commer-
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cial support in the sem;e above stated, this <l ,, 
t tl C 
. . Of. ~10 exc~se. ie omm1ss1on from its duty of mak. 
mg a fmdmg as the result of its considerati 
of that evidence. The language of .Mr. J usti~,'.'. 
Butler in Atchison, '1.1. & S. :B~. Ry. Co. v. Unitt>i: 
States, 295 U.S. 193, 55 S. Ct. 748, 79 L. ed. 138'1 
that: ., 
" 'This court ·will not search the record to 
ascertain whether, by use of what thL're may lw 
found, general and ambiguous statements i1; fo, 
report intended to serve as findings may uy con 
struction be given a meaning sufficiently definit, 
and certain to constitute a valid basis for !ht 
order. In the absence of a finding of essential 
basic facts, the order cannot be sustained.' 39:1 
U. S. 193, at pages 201, 202, 55 S. Ct. 748 at pag:" 
752, 79 L. ed. 1382. 
seems pertinent. It is not the duty of the court 
to make findings for the Commission and when 
the Commission has failed in its duty to make sncli 
findings, it is impossible for the court to revie1: 
its conclusion. This too we regard as reversibJ, 
error." 
The above case hold8 that a finding of public convt'll· 
ience and necessity is an ultimate finding only, whiril 
must be supported by primary findings of the facts whicl1 
constitute public com·enience and n0cessity. In addition, 
such findings as that '' ... there appears a need for 1 
transportation service ·which can originate at a porn: 
other than Salt Lah' Cit~· ... " is not sufficient wlw11 
Salt Lake City is 110t a "point"; whPn its many street' 
and highways are not rpfrrred to in the context of hi 
hearing and when the existing S(Jnicc points of other r111 
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rir·rs are not refrrred to at all. In such event, individual 
l indings nnrnt bP made upon precise locations and express 
jg;eds and exprPss deficiencies of existing carrier services. 
Jn eontrast to thf~ requirements set forth by the 
Conrt of AP}wals in the Saginaw case, such purported 
finding in tlte Commi::;;sion decision at (R. 621) is at best 
an ultimate finding. How much transportation is re-
qmrPd, hy whom is it required, from where to where is 
it required. \Ve are dealing here with a 26 mile area 
\\J1ic11 intlndes the mo::;;t heavily concentrated population 
and streets and highways in the State of Utah and yet 
tl1e Commission is unable to specify any locations, any 
points, anything whatever upon which a finding as to 
need could be based. 
The case of Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. Federal 
Communications Cornnii0sion, 175 F. 2d 351, involved 
competitive permit::;;, one requesting authority to con-
struct a new station and the other requesting authority to 
change frequency in an existing station. This case 
also contained an excellent discussion of the various 
findings of fact which must be made by an administrative 
body in aniving at its ultimate decision. Commencing 
at page 356, the court stated: 
"The principles which govern the interplay of 
administrative and judicial functions in a com-
parative consideration are basically the same as 
lhosf' which govern in the determination of the 
qnali fication of a single applicant. The Com-
ruission has wide powers and discretion, but upon 
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appeal the courts must determine whether its .. 
tion was w~thi:r_i its :st.at~1to1y authority and ap1'.:, 
cable constitutional lnmtattom;, and the findinu. 
conclusions and decision must Le such that tl. 
courts can exercise that jurisdictiou. But (1
1 
essentials to kgally valid conclm;ions differ, a.· 
the two problems, one of bare qualification ai
1
,, 
the other of corn1mrative qualifications, differ. J· 
respect to com para ti ve d(•ei s ions, th('se arp t!. 
essentials: ( 1) The ba:sc>s or reasons for ti 
final conclusion must be clearly stated. (2) Tl
1
w 
conclusion must be a rational result from tb 
findings of ultimate fact:-;, and those findings llllb 
be sufficient in number and substance to snppo: 
the conclusion. ( 3) The ultimate facts as foun1: 
must appear as rational inferences from the finri. 
ings of the basic facts. ( 4) The findings of th1 
basic facts must be sup]Jorted by suLstantial Pri 
deuce. ( 5) Findings mu:st be made in respect(,, 
every difference, except those whid1 are frirolou: 
or wholly unsubstantial, between the apvlica11l: 
indicated by the evidence and advanced by OJ11 
of the parties as effective. (G) r_rhe final conclrr 
sion mm;t be upon a composite consideration o, 
the findings as to the several differences, pro anc 
con each applicant. 
"The first four of these essentials are esta~ 
lished requisites of Commission decisions. TJH 
progress to a valid conclusion, as long-since cstan 
lished by tlw cases, is: to receive the evidenc1: 
then to make from the e\'idence findings of baft· 
facts; then to mak<,, hy inference from the has11 
facts, findings of tlw nltirnate facts whir!t ai« 
requisite to dPcision; then to draw a final conel 11 
sion by tlw applic-ation of the statutory critt>ll 11 ' 
to the ultima,tp facts. rJ1)H• last two <•ssentiab a)iui 
stated - ( 5) and ( G) - a re made necessary !J~· 1:,. 
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peculiar characteristics of a comparative deter-
mination. The Commission cannot ingore a ma-
terial difference between two applicants and make 
findings in respect to selected characteristics only. 
Nt'ith~~r can it base its conclusion upon a selection 
from among its findings of differences and ignore 
all other findings. It must take into account all 
the eharaeforistics which indicate differences, and 
reach an over-all relative determination upon an 
evalnation of all factors, conflicting in many 
cases. • * .,, 
It is to be observed from the Johnston case that a 
t:·onuuission cannot ignore material differences in dis-
1mt0d questions of fact as it did in the instant case, nor 
can it bas0 its ultimate conclusion on such selected find-
ings of fact as it may elect to make. Findings must be 
rnade on every disputed question of fact which is per-
tinent to the ultimate finding of public convenience and 
11ecessity and here the present service offered by exist-
ing certificated carriers was completely ignored and the 
evidence disregarded. 
While the above decisions relating to administrative 
apmcies go into considerable detail as to the nature 
and extent of findings ·which must be made, this Court 
ni. its considerations of administrative matters has basic-
ally arrived at the same conclusions. 
In Aetna Life Ins. Co. et al. v. Industrial Commis-
,t·rn, 64 Ftah 415, 231 P. 442 (1924) the court annulled 
an award by the Industrial Commission stating that there 
was not substantial evidence for the findings that the 
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accident occurred while plaintiff's insurance was in effpl.
1 
In doing so, the court said at page 444 of the Paeifii· 
Reporter: 
"A finding of a material fact cannot sustaiJ
1 
an award, unless the finding is ::supported by snJ
1 
stantial evidence. The evidence need not be dir11r1 
or positive; it may be by circumstances or oth~r 
facts from which the fact found may be infemd. 
But in the latter case the inference must be 8 
legitimate one. There must be a reasonable theon 
which leads to the conclusion reached. A findin0 
cannot be predicated upon mere surmise or crn' 
jecture .... 
"This court is reluctant to set aside a finding 
of fact made by the Industrial Commission. I1 
will not do so if the finding is fairly supported by 
legal evidence. There are supposable cases in-
volving the question here presented where thP 
evidence would reasonably support a finding 
eithPr way on the question of proximate causr 
and the finding be sustained, but this is not sucl1 
a case. 
"For the reason that the findings and con-
clusions of the Industrial Commission complainea 
of are not supported by substantial evidence. The 
award as against the plaintiff is annulled." 
In considering whether the Commission had failea 
to make findings of fact on material matters this Cour1 
considered in some depth the findings made by the Corn· 
mission in Utah Light and Traction Co. v. Public Servi£1 
Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683 (1941). 
The Commission elaborates at Page 686 of Paeifii 
Reporter concerning the findings made in that case. 
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'"The Commission expressly found that the 
Traction Company 'operates a bus service south-
1varrl on State Street serving Murray, Midvale, 
and Bandy, on a schedule of 22% minutes during 
peak periods, and 45 minutes at other times' and 
that the 'Salt Lake and Utah R. R. Corporation 
operates in the territory adjacent to Redwood 
Road (through the west side of Salt Lake Valley) 
with five trains north into Salt Lake City and five 
trains south each day.' Of course the Commission 
ne<'d not descend to such details as to find the 
number of people riding each bus or train daily. 
'rhe Commission did find that the new service 
would stimulate the use of public carriers rather 
than private cars and that such service as the 
Airways would give would meet the demands of 
the public more adequately. It found that the 
territory ahove set forth as without bus service is 
in 1wed of bus service both intercommunity, and 
into Salt Lake City, such as Airways offers it. 
It found that this new service was in the public 
welfare; that it would tend to develop new homes 
and new enterprises in the territory beyond Salt 
Lake City limits, and that general development 
of that area would be promoted and stimulated by 
the new service. Such are proper matters for the 
Commission to consider. Mulcahy v. Public Serv-
ice Commission, Utah, 117 P.2d 298 (not yet re-
ported [in State Reports]). It found that the part 
of the territory to be served by the Airways is new 
territory being pioneered; and that the roads are 
not overburdened with traffic, and the new serv-
ice will not interfere with the use of the roads by 
the general public. It found that new service is 
needed, at least to the extent set forth in the 
ap11lication, and therefore to that extent the serv-
iee rnnv rendered is inadequate. It found that the 
Airways permit will not substantially detract 
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from, nor impair existing common carri1:~r servir·i" 
that it will not be detrimental to the proplf' 1,. 
the State of Utah or the localities to be served 
These findings are not set forth in the detail a
1111 
particularity nsed by courts of law whosp jndu 
ments determine ultimate rights of lifo and prn~ 
erty title, nor need they be so definite nor orderh 
These determinations of the Commission inroh· 
questions of licernst', or privilege between the sn1 
erign people and the individual who seeks to 01  
tain or enjoy such rights or privilege in th(' corn 
mon good. The welfare of the public is the riara. 
mount issue. These rights are given and regulali-11 
to protect the people generally and to insure au 
opportunity for all individuals, and each con1 
munity, to grow and develop and assure its in 
habitants the most complete and abundant Jif 
possible, commensurate with equal privileges for 
all others." 
ThPn, if' vast difference between this case and the om 
at bar cone~·rning the matters on which findings wer: 
made and on which the Court apparently satisfied itsfl: 
there was substantial evidence. Here there is no findin~ 
concernng the equipment which will be dedicated to tJ1, 
intended service and all equipment referred to is clearly 
shown by the record to have been dedicated to otliet 
service. 
Here there is no finding that Salt Lake Transpor 
tation Service "would meet the demands of the pnbli: 
more adequately" than existing service. 
Here there is no finding that the areas sought tn 1, 
certificated are "without bus service," or "in need n 
bus service." 
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Hne there is no finding as to any tendency on the 
p;u t or the proposed service to "development of new 
] 1ouws and nPw enterpris<:>s," or contribute in any way 
to the economy. 
'J1he Coturnission has failed to make the findings 
cssPntial lo sustain its granting of a certificate of con-
1enicnc1· and necessity and its order must be set aside. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COM-
MISSION'S FINDINGS THAT THERE IS A PUBLIC 
NEED FOR ADDITIONAL TOUR AND CHARTER 
SERVICE AND THAT OTHER CARRIERS PRES-
ENTLY CERTIFICATED CANNOT PERFORM THE 
SERVICE IF REQUIRED AND THAT PUBLIC CON-
VENIENCE AND NECESSITY REQUIRES THE 
GRANTING OF A CERTIFICATE OF CONVEN-
IENCE AND NECESSITY TO AN ADDITIONAL 
CARRIER. 
Salt Lake ':Cransportation failed to present any evi-
dence r0nc1•rning a need of the general public for tour 
or chart<'l' senice originating and returning to and from 
points along Contincntal's certificated origin and return 
points. 'rhesf: points are on U.S. Highway 91 in Salt 
Lah City and sonth and between Provo and Deer Creek 
Darn::;itc; along U. S. Highway 40 west in Salt Lake and 
\Hst to the Utah-Nevada line and from the Utah-Wyo-
ming state line on the north to the Utah-Arizona state 
line on thP sonth on U. S. Highway 91. These points are 
;ilso along TT. 8. Highway 40 in Salt Lake City and to 
the TTtah-Colorado state line and on U. S. Highway 91 
l 1etween ~alt Lake City and Provo and from U. S. High-
'nty 1~~:l lwhn·en Provo and Heber City or from U. S. 
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Highway 52 from Orem to tlw junction of L:. ;:-;. tl1gll 110 , 
189 and from Heber to the Utah-Colorado state linr ow.
1 
U. S. Highway 40. ContiHental gPnPrally holdt; 11i
1 
authority to serve charfrr round trips originating 
1111 
all routes served in ih; n~gular common carrier opera 
tion, restricted only against transportation ser\·ice for 
tours on any regular schednl<> or regular route and trip, 
wholly within municipal corporate limit::; sPrved by nr)J0,1 
transportation companies ( R. G22-G23). 
The Record is also devoid of any testimony or er· 
dence indicating that Continental had failed or refus~u 
to perform service requested of it. As a matter of far:r 
Salt Lake Transportation witnesses, without exceptiun, 
testified either that they were unaware Continental coulil 
perform these services, Gertrude Howard (R. 241): 
Lee Bronson (R. 324, 328), or that they would have nu 
objection if Contirn·ntal or another carrier perforrne:l 
the service, Howard (R. 241, 244); Bronson (R. 32±1 
UndPr the:'\e eireurnstances it is apparent Salt Lak1 
Transportation has failed to present evidence upon whicl 
the Commission could base a finding as to need for the 
required service. The prior certification of a carrier i1 
a particular area, as is the case of Continental here. 
carries with it considerable weight as a matter of law 
and burdens the applicant to a degree of proof whirl~ 
shows that existing carriers cannot or will not perform 
the required service. 
This court in Utah Light & Traction Co. i:. Pub/Ir 
Service Commission, et al., supra, at Page 690 of tl1 1 
Pacific Reporter said: 
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" ·_ .. That existing carriers engaged in trans-
portation to and from a cPrtain field or territory, 
rendering the service it is permitted or ordered 
to <lo, r<•asonably, adequately and efficiently, is 
not lightly or ruthlessly to be interfered with, or 
snbjeded to needless competition, is evident from 
the provisions of the statute. 
* * * * 
" 'An applicant desiring to enter a new terri-
tory, or to enlarge the nature or type of the serv-
ice he is permitted to render must therefore show 
that from the standpoint of public convenience 
and necessity there is need for such service; that 
the existing service is not adequate and conveni-
ent, and that his operation would eliminate such 
inadequacy and inconvenience. . '" 
The co mt also said, at Page 690: 
'' ... when a territory is satisfactorily serviced, 
and its tram;poration facilities are ample, a dupli-
cation of such service which unfairly interferes 
with the existing carriers may undermine and 
weaken the transportation setup generally and 
thus deprive the public of an efficient permanent 
service. True, existing carriers benefits from the 
n~stricted competition, but this is merely inci-
dental in the solution of the problem of securing 
adequate and permanent service .... " 
And in Salt Lake Transfer Conipany vs. Public 
Service Coinmi:iiiion of Utah, et al., 11 Utah 2d 121, 
3:-i,"i P.2d 70G, 710 (1960): 
"A search of the record reveals nothing upon 
which to base the conclusion that the addition of 
Barton's services will in any way add to public 
eom'1-'nie11ce and necessity with regard to explo-
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~~ves. As the record now stands, Ashworth anrJ 
;:)alt. La~e Transfer are ~endering an adequa
11
, 
service m the transportation of explosives. Bf'. 
fore additional service is authorized by the Culll 
mission, the applicant must show that the existiu" 
service is not adequate and convenient and tha~ 
his proposed operation would eliminate the inadP. 
quacy and inconvenience." 
And in Lake Shore J.ll otor Coach Lines, Inc. , 
Welling, ct al., 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011, 1014 (19j9i 
"The Commission is charged with the responsi 
bility of over-all planning so that the pnblic wil: 
be furnished with the most frequent, economieat 
and convenient service possible, not only premt 
ly, but in the long run. This involves considera 
tion of all of the pertinent factors bearing U]JOL 
the advisability of authorizing additional servicl': 
it includes protection of existing carriers who)1 
services may become impaired or even destroye1l 
by permitting competition, the potential of bu>i· 
ness, the ability, financial and otherwise, of th1 
applicant to render the proposed service, and tL1 
burdening of the highways. The Commission must 
weigh all of such matters in determining whetlte: 
public convenience and necessity require the pru 
posed service .... " 
In Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennet/ 
et al., 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958), the Cour'. 
set aside an order of the Commission granting an ii' 
crease to a common carrier on the grounds that theri 
was no support in the record for a finding that publ 11 
convenience and necessity required the additional ser 
ice, and that its effect would be to impair transportati1J' 
service by undermining the economic well being of tJ 
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''('lTices then in operation. Speaking generally of the 
principles underlying regulation of utilities, the court 
;:,a1<l, commencing at Page 10G2, of the Pacific Reporter: 
"lt is well to have in mind the principles under-
lying the regulation of common carriers by the 
Public 8ervice Commission. Generally speaking, 
competition is a good thing because it tends to 
i:ontrol exce:sses and abuses, and to produce the 
best goods and services at the lowest prices. It 
thus :serves as a vital and stimulating force in 
om economic an<l industrial life and is some-
times said to be the life of commerce. An excep-
tion to this generality exists in services providing 
gas, telephone, electricity, transportation and cer-
tain others where competition would result in 
duplication of expensive facilities which the public 
would have to pay for in the long run and thus 
be inimical to its interest. In order to eliminate 
such waste full duplicaion of facilities and serv-
ices, businesses of that type are granted monopoly 
franchi:ses. As a condition to such privilege, the 
utilities are obliged to submit to regulation by 
public authority, which takes the place of the 
controls usually enforced by competition. . . . 
\Vhen a carrier applies to institute a new carry-
ing service, the Commission must take into ac-
eount, not only the immediate advantage to some 
members of the public in increased service, and to 
the applying carrier in permitting him to enlarge 
the scope of his business, but must plan long-range 
for the protection and conservation of carrier 
st>rvice so that there will be economic stability 
aud continuity of service. This obviously cannot 
he. done nnles~ existing carriers have a reasonable 
degree of protection in the operations they are 
rnain 1 aining. 
i< * * * 
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"Proving that public convenience and necessiti 
would be served by granting additional carrir 
authority means something more than showin;, 
the mere generality that some members of th'. 
public would like and on occasion use such type 01 
transportation service. In any populous area it 
is easy enough to procure witnesses who will ~a 1 
that they would like to see more fre(1uent aii~I 
cheaper service. That alone does not prove tha1. 
public convenience and necessity so require. Our 
understanding of the statute is that there should 
be a showing that existing services are in sonw 
measure inadequate, or that public need as to 
the potential of business is such that then: i~ 
some reasonable basis in the evidence to beliew 
that public convenience and necessity justify th" 
additional proposed service." 
Speaking of the applicant's witnesses the court con-
tinued, at Page 1064: 
" ... It is obvoius, as they without exception 
admitted, that their self-interest would be served 
by having more carriers with more frequrn1 
schedules. In short, the speediest and cheapest 
transportation possible, which purpose an addi-
tional carrier would tend to serve. In other words, 
from their point of view, the more carriers tht 
better. This is quite understandable because thei, 
were in no way concerned with the long-rangt 
planning hereinabove referred to, nor with keep· 
ing existing carriers solvent and in operation." 
In a concurring opinion Justice Henriod stated, a! 
Page 1065: 
"Existing carriers that have expended risk cap 
ital and have complied with tariff and othet Co~mission requirements, ordinarily are entitleil 
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to protection against competition until a proposed 
competitor or someone else establishes bv sub-
stantial evidence a failure to perform the ~ervice 
-..vhich the Commission has authorized and ordered 
them to perform." 
The language in this case squares on all fours with 
the Hecord. 
Jn th<~ instant proceeding, as the court states, "In 
any populous area, it is easy enough to get witnesses 
who will say tlH)y would like to see more frequent and 
cheaper ;:;ervice." No witness testified on behalf of 
Salt Lake Transportation who said any more than that. 
H is obviously to the interest of those persons involved 
in tomist and publicity work, in chamber of commerce 
work, in recreational work, to press for added services 
which they can publicize for their own self-serving inter-
est. If that is all that is required in a case of public 
comenience and necessity, the Public Service Commis-
sion has indeed lost its statutory jurisdiction and author-
ity to the tourism council or various chamber of com-
merce groups throughout the state. 
Salt Lake Transportation not only has failed to 
meet its burden in showing existing carriers cannot 
perform or are unwilling to perform or are incapable 
of performing the service for which it applied and to 
introduce with any particularity evidence on which the 
Commission could base a finding as to any need, but 
it blatantly and categorically stated that its application 
was com1)etitive -..vith service being rendered by Con-
ti1wntal. Mr. Boynton was asked: 
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"Q. And you want to compete with them on tli·· 
charter business 1 ° 
"A. We want to compete with the Continrnta. 
yes, sir." (R. 276). 
r:L1his is a tacit acknowledgment on the part of Sal~. 
Lake Transportation that its service is not unusual 1jJ 
something that isn't being presently offered to the publi: 
but that it intends to expand existing authoritv to 111 
completely competitive with services already being oi 
fered by carriers presently holding certificates of con 
venience and necessity from the Commission. 
Another serious question presents itself here wit! 
respect to the investment made by Continental and othe1 
carriers. Continental bases 25 buses in Utah and a~ o 
December 31, 1965 had a Utah investment of $3,79-1:,230.~; 
(R. 510, 596). Salt Lake Transportation, on the ot!H; 
hand, would be using equipment already dedicated 11 1 
other services (R. 287) or leasing equipment (R. 33!1 
to perform the competitive service. The CommiRsiun 
has arbitrarily refused to consider evidence as to ei 
penditures of existing carriers and the consequenti:i 
duplication and waste. Its findings cannot be snpporte1l 
The Order of the Cormnission must be set aside fo: 
the reason that Salt Lake Transporation has not su: 
tained its burden of proof so as to enable the Conuui1 
sion to find there is a public need for its service or thn 
existing carriers are unable, or unwilling to perform tli 
services in question. 
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POINT III 
'THE C01\11VIISSION'S ORDER IS UNLAWFUL, ARBI-
TRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN THAT THE COM-
MISSION REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE AND TAKE 
INTO ACCOUNT UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE 
OF DAMAGE TO EXISTING CARRIERS AND 
THEIR SERVICE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE 
GRANTING OF THE APPLICATION. 
T\fr 8erge L. Campbell of Continental testified with 
respect to Exhibits 40 through 54 (R. 584-599c). These 
general!.) show the Continental system income and its 
equipment and investment in the State of Utah, which is 
considerable. 
Continental bases 25 buses in Utah (R. 510); in 
196!1 had revenues of $3,794,230.07 (R. 596); and had 
D Utah imyroll of $525,480.43 (R. 597). 
Of significance are schedules of net operating reve-
nues and operating ratios in Utah. For the year 1961 
the net operating revenue was $135,445.35, with an oper-
R.ting ratio of 87.4% and bus miles operated of 2,464,885 
( R. 585). For the year 1962 the net operating revenue 
was $90,346.83, operating ratio 92.4%, bus miles oper-
ated of 2,634,223 (R. 587). For the year 1963 the net 
operating revenue was $40,159.05, with an operating 
ratio of 9G.5% and bus miles operated of 2,509,393 (R. 
589), For the year 1964 the net operating revenue was 
$GG,671.53, with an operating ratio of 94.7% and bus 
rnilrs op0rated of 2,498,035 (R. 591). For the year 1965 
the net operating revenue was $16,294.61, with an oper-
atmh' r·atio of 98.7% and bus miles operated of 2,574,228 
(R 5!)8). 
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It can be readily seen that in 19G5 Continental hi, 
Special Bus Revenues, which jnclude charter and trJii· 
services, of $68,175.91. It derived at year end a w 
operating revenue of $1G,294.Gl. 'l1he comparison of tlrl·:, 
figures can lead to no other conclusion than the chartr: 
services performed by Continental are of extrem(' iii 
portance to it. Mr. Campbell testified that $8,327 tlila 
revenue was directly attributable to Utah charters in tlir 
year 1965 (R. 513). This is approximately 50% of tL 
net profit Continental made in the State of u tah in 10G:1• 
although obviously some expenses would be deducterl 
from the gross revenue figures. 
Mr. Campbell testified that the operating ratioi 
show: 
"A. Well, they show that from year to year om 
operating revenue is climbing all the time aml 
our profits are becoming less for operating 
the same amount." (R. 503). 
He further testified: 
"Q. And Exhibit 54 is a statement of the intra 
state charters operated in Utah during 1965: 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. At any time during 1965, Mr. Campbell,&1 
your cornpames have to turn down a cha1 
ter~ 
"A. No, sir, we did not. vVe had equipment avail 
able at all times." (R. 504) 
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The interest of Continental in this proceeding re-
1a1\:'i; to charkr 01wrations (R. 516). Revenues lost 
because of Salt Lake Transportation certifications will 
affed arnl darnag<> Continental. 
'l1he <·vidcnce completely contradicts the Commis-
"wn's pnrported findings, that existing carriers would 
uot lie detrimentally affected by the granting of the 
applieat1on and the Order should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission has failed to make Findings on 
essential elements to a case of public convenience and 
necessity and the Commision is without the ability to 
base Findings of a Certificate of Convenience and Neces-
sity on evidence that has been presented. 
'l'he Order of the Commission is, therefore, arbi-
trary, capricious, and unlawful and must be vacated, 
annulled, and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SIDNEY G. BAUCOM 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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